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Verification games & slashing

Economics of refereed verification

research/verification-game

Inspection-game economics of refereed verification: stake substitutes for re-execution, extra verifiers free-ride, and optimal tolerance/stake under floating-point drift.

7 tests

What it found

Inspection-game equilibrium for optimistic verification: stake substitutes for re-execution, extra verifiers dilute rewards (free-riding saturates), and joint tolerance/stake design under floating-point drift. Stylised model.

Paper, code and results

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Proper scoring & elicitation28Effort & peer prediction9Verification games & slashing19Detection & tolerances14Markets as routers13Prediction-market design9Paying contributors8Decentralised training systems23Digital twins & sim-to-real164LLM chip design loops40Robot manufacturing loops53Ambient AI assistant46Self-replicating manufacturing34Simulation-first design64Engineered clothing45Task-specific AI accelerators40Algorithmic chip-design loops42Open-source purpose-built robots44The software-engineering loop43Adversarial human imitation41Open-source residential construction41Autonomous multi-angle capture34Sensing, imaging and 3D31Energy supply and dense energy storage39Robot societies among people31Agentic co-design of low-cost robots27Laundry-hanging robots25Machine learning on qualitative data23Robots on the building site27Civilizations & group psychology1History & human sciences1

Produced with AI assistance (Claude). Results are from the code in this repository and are simulated or stylised unless the abstract says otherwise; nothing here implies affiliation with or endorsement by any lab, researcher or company cited. MIT licensed.