What does it cost to pay for a ranking instead of probabilities?
research/rank-elicitation
Eliciting class rankings with linear rank-weight scores: strictly proper, adjacent-swap regret exactly (p_i−p_j)(w_r−w_{r+1}), beats Brier-derived rankings per unit range below gap 1/(K−1) (250× at gap 10⁻³), equal spacing is optimal, top-k set costs the same as the mode, detection sample size unchanged.
What it found
A verifier who reports only the order of K classes can be paid with a score linear in the outcome indicator. It is strictly proper, and swapping two classes at adjacent ranks costs exactly (pi−pj)(wr−wr+1), linear in the gap. Per unit of payment range that beats a Brier-derived ranking whenever the gap is below 1/(K−1) (2.5× at gap 0.1, 250× at 0.001, K=5). Equal spacing maximises the smallest incentive, ranking everything costs K−1 times the mode, a top-k set costs the same as the mode, and the sample size to detect a swap is identical to Brier’s.
A figure from its own output
Paper, code and results
More in Proper scoring & elicitation
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Proper scoring & elicitation28Effort & peer prediction9Verification games & slashing19Detection & tolerances14Markets as routers13Prediction-market design9Paying contributors8Decentralised training systems23Digital twins & sim-to-real164LLM chip design loops40Robot manufacturing loops53Ambient AI assistant46Self-replicating manufacturing34Simulation-first design64Engineered clothing45Task-specific AI accelerators40Algorithmic chip-design loops42Open-source purpose-built robots44The software-engineering loop43Adversarial human imitation41Open-source residential construction41Autonomous multi-angle capture34Sensing, imaging and 3D31Energy supply and dense energy storage39Robot societies among people31Agentic co-design of low-cost robots27Laundry-hanging robots25Machine learning on qualitative data23Robots on the building site27Civilizations & group psychology1History & human sciences1
Produced with AI assistance (Claude). Results are from the code in this repository and are simulated or stylised unless the abstract says otherwise; nothing here implies affiliation with or endorsement by any lab, researcher or company cited. MIT licensed.