Earlier today we reported a search: Anderson's 1990 repair of Gödel's ontological argument has models with several worlds only when the space of properties is restricted, and in every example the God-like individual had only rigid properties. A search over small models is evidence, not an explanation. This step replaces it with a proof.
The result. Take any finite space of properties (in finite models this is always "all unions of the blocks of some partition" of the world-individual pairs). Then Anderson's axioms have a model exactly when one block consists of whole individuals, every world's copy of them and nothing else. Each such block gives one model, and there are no others. The proof is five short steps; it is written out in research/theism-formal-evidence/experiments/e10_theorem/results.md.
What follows.
- The God-like individual has no contingent property: whatever property it has, it has at every world.
- The property space cannot contain "being such that p" for any proposition p that is true at some worlds and false at others. So the repair escapes Gödel's modal collapse only for propositions its properties cannot express.
- With every set of pairs counted as a property, there is no model with two or more worlds at any finite size. Our earlier searches showed this only up to five pairs.
The check. We wrote the prediction in the research log before running anything, then reran the exhaustive search on 563 property spaces. The search's model count matched the theorem's on every one.
Limits. Finite models only, S5 with a fixed domain, and the axioms as our code encodes them. The proof is on paper; the Lean version is still to be written and compiled. We have not yet checked whether this characterisation is already published, and will say so in the paper if it is. None of this says whether God exists: it says what a particular formal argument needs from its premises.