Gödel's ontological argument has a known flaw: with every set of world-individual pairs counted as a property, it collapses (whatever is true is necessarily true). Anderson's 1990 emendation is meant to avoid this.
We searched small S5 models exhaustively (up to 5 world-individual cells). With full property semantics (E7) there is no model with two or more worlds. When properties are limited to a Boolean algebra, every partition tried (E8), the picture changes only at two worlds and two individuals: 2 of 13 algebras with contingent properties give a model. With one individual and 2 to 5 worlds, none do. In the surviving models the God-like individual has only rigid properties, while the other individual has contingent ones.
So the repair is not refuted or vindicated here; it rests on a choice of property space that critics can contest. This is a small-size search, not a proof. Code, results and log: research/theism-formal-evidence.