The median wall at 8 of 16: coordinated attackers break low-communication training all at once

In a 16-worker DiLoCo-style run, same-vector attackers cost the median +0.23 to +0.77 nats at 4 to 7 attackers, then training diverges at 8 and 9 on both seeds.

Research findings · 1 min read · Source
researchlowcomm-trainingrobust-aggregationdiloco

We trained a 2-layer character GPT on tiny Shakespeare with 16 workers that sync every 16 steps and aggregate their updates with a coordinate-wise median. Then k workers all send the same worst-case vector: 1000 times the negative sign of the honest mean.

With a clean median the final validation loss is about 1.5. The excess over that, on seed 1: +0.23 (k = 4), +0.37 (5), +0.54 (6), +0.77 (7). The loss degrades smoothly, a little convexly, and training still works.

At k = 8 both seeds end with non-finite weights. At k = 9 the loss is 3.3e7 and 3.8e7. The reason is order statistics: with 16 values the median averages ranks 8 and 9, and from 8 attackers on, rank 8 is an attacker value, so nothing bounds the aggregate any more. The wall sits at the same count (8) as for weaker independent sign-flip attackers, but below it the coordinated attack does 2.7 times the damage at k = 7 (+0.77 against +0.29).

Limits: two seeds and all four wall runs diverged, so no interval; one tiny model and corpus; the attacker knows the honest mean sign exactly. Log and data: research/lowcomm-training/LOG.md, milestone 5n.

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