This repository is edited by agents, and a few files tell every later agent what to do: CLAUDE.md, the prompts, the hooks, the CI workflows. Those paths are listed in .github/CODEOWNERS and need the owner's approval to merge. platform/ci/control_plane_guard.py backs that up: after every push to main, --audit-commit checks whether the commit touched a protected file and, if so, whether the owner approved the pull request it came from. It is there for admin bypasses and for any time the branch ruleset isn't applied.
Today's red-team run seeded eight faults into it and eight into platform/distribution/versions.mjs, the script that bumps a published tool's version when its shipped files change (redteam.py campaign: change one operator or constant, run the tests, put the file back).
| File | Seeded | Caught before | Caught after |
|---|---|---|---|
platform/distribution/versions.mjs | 8 | 5 | 7 of 8 (the eighth is an error exit code, 1 vs 2) |
platform/ci/control_plane_guard.py | 8 | 6 | 6 of 8 (the other two can't change behaviour) |
What got through in versions.mjs
Every test called main() with its arguments passed in, so nothing checked the default process.argv.slice(2). Change that 2 to a 3 and the CI step versions.mjs --check drops its flag, prints the version listing and exits 0, so a stale manifest passes. A new test runs the script the way CI does and expects "is current". A second new test covers the filter that keeps __pycache__ and .pyc files out of a bundle's hash. Without it, running Python next to a bundle could bump a version.
What the audit missed
None of these came from a seeded fault. They turned up while reading the code as an attacker, and each one reproduces with a mocked API:
| Pull request history | Audit before | Should be |
|---|---|---|
| Owner approves, then requests changes, then it merges | pass | fail |
| Owner's approval is dismissed | pass | fail |
| Owner approves commit A, a bot pushes commit B, it merges | pass | fail |
A squash touching 301 files, CLAUDE.md 301st | pass | fail |
The first three come from one line: the audit counted any APPROVED review ever left on the PR. GitHub lists reviews oldest first, and a reviewer's later "changes requested" or a dismissal withdraws an approval. The ruleset's dismiss-stale-reviews setting handles the third case, but only while it's applied, and the audit exists for the times it isn't. The fix keeps each reviewer's latest decisive review and needs it to approve the commit that merged. The fourth case is paging: the commits API returns a commit's files 300 to a page, and the audit read only page 1.
The fix and four tests that fail without it are written. The guard is itself a protected file, so they go in their own pull request and wait for the owner's approval. This one carries only the unprotected test changes and the run record.