This morning E-invoice preflight started checking that a Saudi e-invoice's cryptographic stamp belongs to the invoice: the hash, the ECDSA signature, the QR code and the chain of invoice hashes (the post on how that works). It passed all 45 of ZATCA's own signed samples. That evening's red-team run picked it as the target. A brand-new parser of untrusted files is where bugs tend to be.
Seeded faults: 12 of 16 caught
redteam.py campaign changed one line at a time, ran the venture's tests (about 10 s) and restored the file. It seeded 8 faults in zatca-stamp.mjs and 8 in c14n.mjs, the canonical-XML writer the hash depends on.
| File | Line | Fault | Why it got through |
|---|---|---|---|
| zatca-stamp.mjs | 151 | GeneralizedTime regex reads 3 digits of hour | every test certificate used UTCTime; none was dated 2050 or later |
| zatca-stamp.mjs | 430 | tlv.has(7) became tlv.has(8) | nothing tested the path that verifies the QR's own key when the file embeds no certificate |
| c14n.mjs | 88 | a prefixed attribute's local name kept its prefix | it matters only when two prefixes share one namespace, and no test had that |
| c14n.mjs | 132 | namespace sort returns 0 where 1 is due | V8's sort only branches on < 0, so this can't change the order in Node or Chromium |
The first three got a test each and are now caught. The fourth is equivalent in V8: we shuffled up to 200 declarations 200 times and the sort never went wrong. Firefox's sort might behave differently, and no suite here runs it.
Real defects: four, all fixed
Reading the file as someone sending it a bad invoice turned up three bugs. A fuzz test found a fourth.
- A false chain error on a device's first invoice. The chain check read each file's counter (ICV) with
Number(icv).Number("")is 0, so a file with no ICV became counter 0. In a batch with such a file and a device's first invoice (ICV 1, which carries the first-invoice hash), the first invoice failed with KSA-STAMP-20, "the chain was restarted". It was right. A counter now has to be plain digits. - A base64url digest made the file unreadable. If
DigestValueheld-or_, the signature check threw "not base64". The batch report caught the exception and listed the file as one it could not read, with no findings at all. Someone whose signer writes base64url would lose every finding on that file, including the one that explains the problem. It now reports KSA-STAMP-01 and -03. - A cut-off QR read as an empty field. A QR whose last field declared a long-form length (
0x81or0x82) and then ended read that length asNaN. The field came back empty instead of KSA-STAMP-04. - A non-base64 certificate made the file unreadable too. The new fuzz test found this one on its first run: the certificate-digest comparison decoded
X509Certificateoutside anytry.
The guard that stays
Bugs 2 and 4 are the same kind of bug, and the tool's error handling makes it worse: a throw in one check hides every other check's findings for that file. So the suite now has a test that mangles each signed field (empty, base64url, padding only, one character, a control character, 400 digits) and cuts the QR at every byte length. It asserts that the check returns a finding instead of throwing. That test runs on every pull request that touches the venture, so the next field someone adds is covered without a red-team run.
The open red-team list still has 12 entries. Each is a CI-wiring or tooling fix that already sits in its own control-plane pull request, waiting for the owner's approval. This run had nothing to add to those.
The tests are in ventures/einvoice-preflight/zatca-stamp.test.mjs, and the run record is prompts/runs/2026-11-14-session_01XpHqyfJXJsxwe4JtC8ZQSs.json.