SYSTEMD UNIT HARDENING CHECK · RUNS IN YOUR BROWSER

What can your systemd service do to the rest of the machine?

Most hand-written .service files run as root with no sandbox at all, so a bug in the service is a bug in the whole machine. Paste your unit and its drop-ins below and this page lists each risky or missing setting with its line and the fix, then writes a starter hardening override you can install with systemctl edit.

Nothing is uploaded. What you paste is read in this browser and never leaves your device, and the tool makes no network calls of its own. It reads the file, not a running system: it is not systemd-analyze security and not a security audit.

1. Paste your unit

Name each block like its real path. A block named app.service.d/override.conf is merged into app.service after it, drop-ins in file-name order, as systemd does.

Paste at least one .service file above and click Check.

Prefer a CLI, or want this in your own CI?

Same logic, zero dependencies, one file:

python3 check.py                          # scan .service files under the current directory
python3 check.py /etc/systemd/system/     # a whole directory, drop-ins merged
python3 check.py app.service --drop-in    # also print a starter hardening drop-in
python3 check.py --format json            # machine-readable
python3 check.py --fail-on-risk           # exit 2 on any medium or high finding

Get check.py from the repo: stdlib only, nothing to install, no network calls, and it never runs systemctl. It reads *.service and NAME.service.d/*.conf and skips .git, node_modules and build folders.

Common questions

How do I harden a systemd service?

Run it as an unprivileged user (User= or DynamicUser=yes), then add sandbox settings in a drop-in with systemctl edit: NoNewPrivileges=yes, ProtectSystem=strict with ReadWritePaths= for what it writes, ProtectHome=yes, PrivateTmp=yes, PrivateDevices=yes, the ProtectKernel settings, SystemCallFilter=@system-service and RestrictAddressFamilies=. Restart the service and read its journal after each change, and loosen any setting that breaks it.

Is it safe to put a password in Environment= in a systemd unit?

No. The systemd.exec manual says environment variables are not suitable for passing secrets: a unit's environment is exposed to unprivileged clients over D-Bus, so any local user can read it with systemctl show, and it is passed down to child processes. Use LoadCredential= and read the file from $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, or an EnvironmentFile= that only root can read.

What does DynamicUser=yes do for security?

systemd allocates a throwaway user for the service while it runs, and, per systemd.exec(5), turns on NoNewPrivileges= and RestrictSUIDSGID=, implies ProtectSystem=strict and ProtectHome=read-only, and gives it a private /tmp. Use StateDirectory= for data it must keep.

Is this the same as systemd-analyze security?

No. systemd-analyze security scores a unit loaded on a running machine with its own weights. This tool reads the files themselves, so it works on units in a repository, a configuration-management template or a container image before they are deployed, and points at the line to change. It does not reproduce systemd-analyze's score.

Does a clean result mean my service is safe?

No. It reads only the settings listed here, does not see EnvironmentFile= contents, vendor drop-ins in other directories or the program itself, and cannot tell which privileges the service truly needs. Have a qualified person review anything that protects valuable data.

More: every setting this tool checks, what it blocks, and what it can break.