nginx Config Security Check · guide

nginx misconfigurations explained: what each one exposes and the fix

Every setting on this page passes nginx -t. nginx is doing exactly what the file says; the file says something its author did not mean. This guide gives the nginx behaviour behind each finding the checker reports, so you can judge whether it applies to you. Behaviour is quoted or paraphrased from the nginx module documentation; several of the patterns were first catalogued by Yandex's Gixy.

A worked example

A shop serves its assets from a folder and wants them cached for a day. The server block sets two security headers:

server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name shop.example.com;
    add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000" always;
    add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;

    location /assets {
        alias /srv/shop/assets/;
        add_header Cache-Control "public, max-age=86400";
    }
}

What node check.mjs shop.conf prints:

shop.conf:8: [high] alias-path-traversal
  location /assets has no trailing slash but alias /srv/shop/assets/ has one, so a request for /assets../ maps to the directory above the alias (the "off-by-slash" traversal): /assets../secret reads /srv/shop/assets/../secret.
  fix: Make the two match: location /assets/ with alias /srv/shop/assets/, or drop the slash from both.
shop.conf:9: [medium] add-header-drops-inherited
  This location block sets its own add_header, so nginx stops sending the add_header lines from the enclosing level here: Strict-Transport-Security (shop.conf:4), X-Content-Type-Options (shop.conf:5). Responses from this block go out without them.
  fix: On nginx 1.29.3 or later, add add_header_inherit merge; to this block or the http block. On older versions, repeat the dropped add_header lines in this block (an include file of shared headers keeps them in one place).
2 findings: 1 high, 1 medium. (1 file read)

Two lines, two holes: anything in /srv/shop/ beside the assets folder is downloadable, and every asset response goes out without HSTS or nosniff. Neither shows up in testing, because the site works.

alias-path-traversal: the off-by-slash

A prefix location matches any URI that starts with its string, and alias replaces that matched part with the alias path. With location /assets and alias /srv/shop/assets/, the URI /assets../config.php matches (it starts with /assets) and becomes /srv/shop/assets/../config.php, one level up. nginx does not collapse assets.., because that path segment is not .. on its own. The fix is to make the slashes agree: location /assets/ with alias /srv/shop/assets/. When the location path ends the same way as the alias path, root is simpler: location /assets/ { root /srv/shop; }.

crlf-injection-uri: $uri where $request_uri belonged

The core module documents $uri as the current URI "in request, normalized", and normalising decodes percent-escapes. So %0d%0a in the path becomes a real carriage return and line feed inside $uri. Put it in return 301 https://$host$uri; and a crafted link makes nginx send a Location header followed by headers the attacker wrote (a cookie, a second redirect, a cache directive). The same goes for add_header, a redirecting rewrite, proxy_set_header and the path part of proxy_pass (where it splits the request to your upstream). $request_uri is the full original request URI with its encoding intact, so the redirect is return 301 https://$host$request_uri;.

add-header-drops-inherited: one header switches off the rest

From ngx_http_headers_module: add_header directives "are inherited from the previous configuration level if and only if there are no add_header directives defined on the current level." A location, or an if inside one, that adds a single Cache-Control header loses every add_header from server and http. The checker lists which headers are dropped. nginx 1.29.3 added add_header_inherit: merge appends the inherited headers to this level's, and off drops them deliberately; the checker honours both. On older versions, keep shared headers in one include file and include it in every block that sets its own.

ssrf-upstream-from-request and ssrf-upstream-from-host

When proxy_pass contains variables, nginx builds the upstream address from them on every request (resolving names with the configured resolver). proxy_pass http://$arg_target; lets anyone pick the address: an internal admin panel, a database's HTTP port, a cloud metadata endpoint. $http_* headers and $cookie_* are just as client-controlled. $host is safer only if the server answers a fixed server_name, because nginx fills it from the request line or the Host header first. Proxy to a named upstream or a fixed host; if the target must vary, map the request value to an allow-list.

cors-reflects-any-origin and origin-regex-unanchored

add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin $http_origin; echoes whatever origin asked, which is the same as allowing every site. With Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true it is worse than * (which browsers refuse to combine with credentials): any page a logged-in user visits can read your API's responses as that user. Guards built from a regex often leak too. if ($http_origin ~* "example.com") also matches https://example.com.attacker.net (no $), https://attacker.net/?example.com (no ^) and https://exampleXcom.net (unescaped dot). Anchor and escape it: ~ ^https://(www\.)?example\.com$, ideally in a map whose result is the header value.

deny-after-allow-all

ngx_http_access_module checks rules "in sequence until the first match is found". After allow all; nothing further is reached, so a later deny 203.0.113.7; never blocks anything. List the denies first, or flip the block to specific allows followed by deny all;.

autoindex-on and status-page-public

autoindex on lists a directory's files when there is no index file, including backups, dumps and anything copied there by mistake. stub_status publishes active connections and request counts; harmless alone, but it should sit behind allow/deny or authentication like any other operational endpoint. The checker treats a server that listens only on 127.0.0.1, [::1] or a Unix socket as private.

open-redirect

return 302 $arg_next; sends visitors wherever the link says, on your domain's reputation: a classic phishing helper. Redirect to a fixed host, and pass the path as a parameter if you must.

ssl-protocol-broken, ssl-protocol-deprecated, ssl-cipher-weak

SSLv2 is prohibited by RFC 6176 and SSLv3 by RFC 7568; RFC 8996 deprecates TLS 1.0 and 1.1. nginx's default ssl_protocols has been TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3 since 1.23.4, so the simplest fix is often to delete the line. RC4, DES and 3DES, export-grade, NULL and anonymous cipher suites are flagged unless they are excluded with !; a published profile such as Mozilla's "intermediate" is a sound starting point.

The low-severity ones

What the checker cannot see

It reads files, so it does not know your nginx version, the values a map, geo or set produces, the application behind proxy_pass, or files you did not paste (an include that matches nothing is reported as a note). A clean scan means these patterns were not found, not that the server is secure. Run nginx -t as well, and check the headers your live server sends with the Security Headers Check.

Back to the nginx Config Security Check.